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TALKING ABOUT YOUR GENERATION
“Our Children” as a Trope in Climate Change Discourse
Kyrre Kverndokk, University of Bergen, Norway
This article examines the rhetorical figuration of “our children” in climate change discourse. Based 
on an analysis of James Hansen’s book, Storms of my Grandchildren (2009), Barack Obama’s speech 
at the COP21 meeting in Paris in 2015, and a newspaper article about the Norwegian environmen-
tal organization, The Grandparents’ Climate Campaign, it argues that the uses of “our children” 
reflect a notion of a family-timed future. The trope implies a “we” working as the active subject in 
the texts, while “our children” simply represents a future to be saved. This structure also authorizes 
“the parent” as a position of enunciation in climate change discourse. The article argues that the 
authority of this position is based on a heteronormative reproductive futurism.1
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In April 2018, the French president Emmanuel Ma-
cron visited the USA and spoke in front of Congress 
on Capitol Hill. His speech concerned the bilateral 
relationship between the USA and France, in the 
past, present and future. He argued for the impor-
tance of international climate agreements, with an 
implicit critique of the USA’s withdrawal from the 
Paris Agreement. He further emphasized the impor-
tance of finding “a smooth transition to a low-carbon 
economy,” and proclaimed: “What is the meaning of 
our lives, really, if we work and live, destroying the 
planet while sacrificing the future of our children?” 
And he added: “I believe in building a better future 
for our children, which requires offering them a 
planet still habitable in twenty-five years.”2 A year 
later, 16-year-old Greta Thunberg spoke in the Brit-
ish Houses of Parliament. Speaking from the posi-
tion of a child and “on behalf of future generations,” 
she declared: “Now we probably don’t even have a 
future anymore” (Thunberg 2019: 57–58). Her state-
ment resonates well with Macron’s worry for “the 
future for our children.” They are both using “the 
child” trope, which is well-established in environ-
mental and climate change discourse (Johns-Putra 
2016; Sheldon 2016). In this article, I will examine 
how this trope was well-used even before Macron 
and Thunberg performed their speeches. I will ask 
why a climate-changed future so often is articulated 
in terms of the future of “our children”, and what the 
uses of this trope tell us about notions of time and 
temporality. By doing so, I will establish a founda-
tion for understanding the rhetorical power of this 
trope, and thus also a foundation for understanding 
how this rhetoric has facilitated for Thunberg and 
the Fridays for Future movement to use “the child” 
as a privileged position of enunciation.
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The temporal aspects of the Anthropocene have 
been widely discussed during the last decade. The 
Anthropocene in general, and the climate crisis 
more specifically, is often described as a collapse of 
the distinction between the ontological zones of na-
ture and culture, including an intertwining of geo-
logical and historical time as two main timescales 
(e.g. Chakrabarty 2009, 2018; Ekström & Svensen 
2014; Latour 2017; Robin & Steffen 2007; Robin 
2013). It has become obvious that historical pro-
cesses and events like the Industrial Revolution of 
the late eighteenth century and the nuclear weapon 
testing in the 1940s and 1950s have had geophysi-
cal consequences, while deep time geological events 
have been given contemporary societal relevance by 
being used to inform climate change modelling. Yet 
the temporality of climate change is not dual, but 
multiple. There is not one natural time scale and one 
human one, but several (cf. Hastrup & Rubow 2014: 
222–285). “Our children” represents a way of organ-
izing social time, often neglected in discussions of 
climate change temporaries.
In this article, I will explore the notion of tem-
porality implied in the trope “our children”. As the 
anthropologist Cecilie Rubow has pointed out, no-
tions of time are embedded in certain practices, ex-
periences and value systems (Rubow 2014: 227). This 
article will explore the intertwining of values, ex-
periences and temporal structures of the trope “our 
children”, by examining how “our children” config-
ures the relationship between the present and the 
future, and how the uses of “our children” authorize 
a certain position of enunciation in climate change 
discourse. The approach will be narratological, and 
I will examine how “our children” is incorporated in 
certain narrative scripts for organizing the relation-
ship between the future and the present. In the book 
Climate Change and Storytelling, sociologist Annika 
Arnold claims: “To understand the nature of the 
political and public debate about climate change, 
we need to understand the narrative structures that 
produce this discourse” (Arnold 2018: 1). This arti-
cle aims to contribute to such an understanding by 
drawing on theories of narrative scripts and liter-
ary scholar Algirdas Greimas’ concept of actants, as 
a class of actors defined by their narrative function 
(Bal 1997: 197; cf. Greimas [1966]1983). Through 
a textual analysis, it will argue that narrative ap-
proaches must also be taken into consideration in 
the study of climate change temporality.
The trope “our children” appears in a variety of 
texts and rhetorical situations. In this article, I will 
examine popular uses of the trope across the societal 
fields of politics, popular science and activism. This 
will be done through close readings of three texts: 
the climate scientist James Hansen’s book, Storms of 
my Grandchildren (2009), Barack Obama’s address 
at the opening session of the climate conference in 
Paris in 2015, and a newspaper article presenting 
the Norwegian environmental organization, the 
Grandparents’ Climate Campaign.3 Hansen and the 
Grandparents’ Climate Campaign are chosen be-
cause they are operating between different fields of 
action. Hansen is not only a scientist; he is also an 
activist, and has been a governmental advisor, while 
several high-profile members of the Grandparents’ 
Climate Campaign are former politicians.
The three selected texts represent three quite dif-
ferent genres; the political speech, the newspaper in-
terview and the popular science book. This choice is 
based on an assumption that different genres imply 
different rhetorical strategies. The political speech is 
oral, held in front of an audience. It is brief in length, 
which implies that the argumentation must be kept 
short and not too complex, and it is often summed 
up in one-liners. In line with the political speech, 
the conversational form of a newspaper interview 
does not allow elaborated arguments. As a written 
representation of an oral conversation, it often holds 
a quite informal style. However, the popular science 
genre is far more elaborative; it aims to transform 
science into a well-told story, balancing scientific 
knowledge with personal narratives and claims in 
its effort to appeal to a general audience. Thus, by 
analyzing different genres I will identify some rhe-
torical patterns and narrative structures across gen-
re conventions and spheres of communication (cf. 
Bakhtin 1986: 60). Further, the three selected texts 
are all intertextually embedded in a transnational 
climate change discourse. Both Hansen’s book and 
ETHNOLOGIA EUROPAEA 50(1) 147
Obama’s speech have had a wide, international out-
reach, while the Grandparents’ Climate Campaign 
is part of a transnational movement. By analyzing 
these three texts, the objective is to identify some 
trans-local patterns in the uses of “our children” as 
a trope.
The Heteronormative Future
My argument is built upon literary scholar Rebekah 
Sheldon’s book, The Child to Come: Life after the 
Human Catastrophe (2016). In a broadly performed 
study, she has analyzed the figuration of “the child” 
in catastrophic future imaginations in American 
culture after 1960. She polemically asks: “[W]hy, 
when we reach out to grasp the future of our planet, 
do we find ourselves instead clutching the child?” 
(Sheldon 2016: vii), and examines a number of films, 
novels and popular environmental publications 
to answer the question. Informed by Lee Edelman 
(2004) and queer theory, she shows how “the child” 
represents a reproductive futurism in American en-
vironmentalism. She uses Al Gore’s bestselling book, 
An Inconvenient Truth (2006), to illustrate this point. 
The opening illustration of Gore’s book is a photo 
from the early 1970s, picturing a young heterosexual 
couple sitting in a canoe. Both are smiling happily, 
and the woman is folding her hands on her pregnant 
belly. The caption reads: “Al and Tipper Gore, one 
month before the birth of their first child, Karenna, 
on the Caney Fork River, Carthage, TN, 1973” (Gore 
2006). Sheldon remarks that this picture “encapsu-
lates the equation between nature, heteronormative 
family structure, reproductive futurism, and the 
landscapification of the future,” which is the subject 
of her work (Sheldon 2016: 38). By using examples 
like this, she convincingly points out how the fu-
ture is naturalized through heteronormative repro-
ductivism. This kind of futurism reproduces social 
norms by projecting them onto the future.
Sheldon also refers to James Hansen’s popular 
scientific book, Storms of my Grandchildren (2009). 
Hansen is a high-profile NASA and Colombia Uni-
versity scholar, known for his contributions to es-
tablishing a public awareness on climate change. At 
a Senate hearing as early as in 1988, he proclaimed 
that it was time to “stop waffling, and say that the 
evidence is pretty strong that the greenhouse effect 
is here” (Hansen in Weart 2003: 155). Storms of my 
Grandchildren was published 21 years later, at the 
end of his career. It is a highly personal account of 
his career as a climate scientist and an activist.
Public events, such as the Senate hearing in 1988, 
are thoroughly described in the book. However, such 
events are not as important for his argument as his 
family seems to be. His family’s history works as 
a narrative framework for the book, and his three 
grandchildren, Jake, Sophie and Connor, constitute 
a leitmotif, representing hopes and dreams, but also 
the uncertainty of the future. For instance, the con-
cluding chapter, which is also entitled “Storms of my 
Grandchildren,” opens with a picture of his grand-
son Jake (Hansen [2009]2011: 237). Sheldon claims 
that this image works as a metonym for the “concept 
of responsibility for future generations” (Sheldon 
2016: 369).
Even though Sheldon understands “the child” as 
a temporal term, expressing notions of the future, 
the trope itself does not necessarily imply a tempo-
ral dimension. It may also refer to innocence, nos-
talgic imaginaries of a childhood, perhaps placed in 
an ideal past, but just as easily in a timeless state. 
However, when Sheldon understands the picture of 
Hansen’s grandson Jake as a metonym for the “con-
cept of responsibility for future generations,” she not 
only emphasizes that she understands “the child” 
trope as future-oriented, she also moves from dis-
cussing the term in the singular to discussing it in 
the plural. This plural form is less abstract than the 
singular form, as it refers to the future in terms of a 
group of people rather than an ideal human state.
Sheldon does not discuss the rhetorical implica-
tions of the fact that Hansen uses his own grandchil-
dren as examples. Yet this has significance for the 
kind of future they represent. They do not represent 
the future as such, but rather a future related to the 
present. To put it simply, the term “grandchild” im-
plies a “grandparent”. The trope they represent ex-
presses such a relationship between people in both 
the present and in the future. Hence, I will argue that 
Jake, Sophie and Connor work as exemplifications 
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of “our children”, implying a contemporary “we”, 
rather than metonyms of “the child”.
It is quite obvious that Hansen’s rhetorical use of 
his grandchildren exposes a heteronormative repro-
ductive notion of the future. But the way he refers to 
his grandchildren unveils more than just reproduc-
tivism and heteronormativity. It also unveils a cer-
tain temporal structure; a specific way of organizing 
the relationship between the present and the future. 
In the first part of this article I will use Hansen’s 
book to explore this temporal structure.
Family Time
The timescales are constantly shifting in Hansen’s 
book, between geological deep time and modern, 
historical time. He uses graphs extensively to illus-
trate his argument, and the time intervals in them 
vary, from millions of years to a few decades dur-
ing the twentieth century. Hansen depicts the so-
called Zachos curve, which is a well-known graph 
in paleoclimatic research. It shows the variety of 
deep-water temperatures during the last 65 mil-
lion years, with a peak 55.9 million years ago. This 
peak is the so-called Paleocene–Eocene Thermal 
Maximum (PETM), a period of 200,000 years, when 
the global temperature rapidly increased due to 
enlarged concentrations of CO
2
 in the atmosphere 
(Hansen [2009]2011: 153). This event is regarded as 
a geohistorical recourse for understanding possible 
future climate scenarios (Svensen, Bjærke & Kvern-
dokk 2019). Hansen also relates the PETM to the 
near future:
[F]or the sake of your children and grandchildren, 
let’s look a little closely at another story in figure 18 
[the Zachos curve], one that is vitally important. I 
refer to the PETM, the Paleocene–Eocene thermal 
maximum, the rapid warming of at least 5 degrees 
Celsius that occurred about 55 million years ago 
and caused a minor rash of extinctions, mainly of 
marine species. (Hansen [2009]2011: 161)
A period of time, 55 million years ago, that lasted for 
200,000 years, is put in relation to two future gen-
erations. Two very different timescales entangle; the 
PETM represents geological deep time, while, follow-
ing the debate on the temporality of Anthropocene, it 
is tempting to regard “your children and grandchil-
dren” as a metaphor for the future within the frame-
work of a historical timescale (cf. Chakrabarty 2009, 
2018). Yet, I will claim that the lifespans of these gen-
erations represent yet another kind of timescale.
This timescale appears clearly when Hansen, in 
another part of his book, refers to a lunch conver-
sation he had with the talk-show host Larry King. 
King had claimed that: “Nobody cares about fifty 
years from now” (Hansen [2009]2011: 131). Hansen 
disagreed:
Over the past few years I thought about our grand-
children and the intergenerational inequity of 
human-made climate change. Larry King’s com-
ment that “nobody cares about fifty years from 
now” didn’t seem right – people do care about 
their children and grandchildren. In fact, the con-
cept of responsibility to future generations is as 
familiar to Americans as their Constitution, with 
its phrase “to ourselves and our Posterity” embed-
ded in the preamble. I believed then, and believe 
now, that if the public had a better understanding 
of the climate crisis, they would do what needed to 
be done. (Hansen [2009]2011: 238)
Hansen’s disagreement with King has to do with dif-
ferent notions of time. While King seems to be refer-
ring to fifty years as a linear calendric time, Hansen 
is thinking in terms of family cycles. The terms 
“their children and grandchildren” unveil a specific 
notion of experienceable time, which is often ne-
glected in discussions on temporality in the climate 
change discourse. This experience-near aspect is 
underscored by the reference to the American con-
stitution. The term “Posterity” used in the constitu-
tion literally means “what comes after”. It is an older 
term for the future, reflecting an early modern no-
tion of temporality, where the future was regarded as 
coming after or behind, rather than being in front of 
the present. It reflects a notion of the future drawing 
on experiences, rather than being open, endless and 
unpredictable (e.g. Hartog 2015; Koselleck 1985).
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Hansen further relates this notion of the future to 
the principle of intergenerational equality, used in 
philosophy, economics and environmentalism since 
the 1970s. The general term “future generations” 
is widely used to describe such an equality. It is, 
however, worth noticing that Hansen is not describ-
ing the future in terms of future generations, as an 
endless chain of generations. He refers specifically 
to the next two generations. By stating the obvious 
fact that “people do care about their children and 
grandchildren,” and giving it a temporal horizon of 
fifty years, he claims that a vernacular experience-
near notion of time is organized in terms of family 
cycles.
Social historian Tamara Hareven has made a dis-
tinction between family time and historical time. 
She defines historical time as “a linear chronologi-
cal movement of changes in a society over decades 
or centuries” (Hareven 1977: 59; cf. Koselleck 1985). 
Family time, on the other hand, is culturally situ-
ated and far less chronological. It is a notion of time 
that is based on how individual life experiences and 
lifespans are embedded into family cycles through 
formative life stages and events, such as childhoods, 
marriages, childbirths, parenthood, parents gradu-
ally getting old and dying, and so on. In this way, the 
individual lifespan is also given a cyclic temporal-
ity, which she terms “family time” (Hareven 1977: 
59–61). Such family time has the capability of tran-
scending the individual life experience, as the time 
of ancestors, grandparents, parents, children and 
grandchildren. Family time is, in this sense, a no-
tion of experienceable time between the individual 
lifespan and historical time.4
Today’s families are not particularly stable units. 
This is not an entirely new trend. Hareven remarks 
that family structures and family timing are his-
torically quite complex, and often unstable (Hare-
ven 1977: 61). People have nevertheless experienced 
time through family experiences and family cycles, 
and people are still experiencing the past and have 
expectations of the future within a family-timed 
framework. The family time of the past must deal 
with family f luctuations, while the family time of 
the future is an ideal time. It is drawing on the ex-
pectations, hopes, dreams and fears for the lives of 
today’s children and children not yet born.
Hansen’s claim that “the concept of responsibil-
ity to future generations is as familiar to Americans 
as their Constitution,” is not merely a claim about 
American family values. It also demonstrates how 
he organizes the relationship between the present 
and the future through a notion of family time. 
Throughout the book, Hansen constantly refers to 
the future in family-timed terms, by addressing the 
reader with the term “your children and grandchil-
dren”, and alternately using his own grandchildren 
as examples.
Life-scripted Future
Hansen also uses family cycles rhetorically to estab-
lish a sense of continuity from the past to the pre-
sent. He draws a line from his parents’ lives to his 
expectations of the lives of his grandchildren: “My 
parents lived to be almost ninety years old, so Jake 
[his two-year old grandson] may be around for the 
rest of this century. Jake has no idea what he is in 
for – that’s just as well. He had better first grow up 
strong and smart” (Hansen [2009]2011: 238). Hans-
en not only expects Jake to live a long life, just like 
the boy’s great-grandparents. He also expects him 
to “grow up strong and smart.” This expression is 
not just an empty saying. A saying is never empty; 
it expresses a cultural value that is conventional 
and naturalized. In this case, the saying expresses 
a naturalized and scripted expectation of a safe and 
happy childhood and a successful adolescence.
These expectations draw on what ethnologist 
Jonas Frykman has termed a life script, a narrative 
model for how a life is expected to be (Frykman 
1992: 261). The term life script has been used in au-
tobiographical studies to analyze how people use 
cultural models to negotiate their life stories. Such 
scripts tend to draw on cultural norms concerning 
formative life events and life timing – when one is 
supposed to get an education, a job and a family, 
and when that life is supposed to end. Ethnologist 
Helena Kåks has shown that life scripts are not only 
used in retrospect, to evaluate life experiences. By 
interviewing a group of Swedish youngsters over a 
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ten-year period, she has shown how culturally dis-
tributed life scripts also structure expectations of 
the future. She found that the life scripts her in-
formants used for imagining the future were highly 
heteronormative. The expectation of a future family 
life was a key motif in these scripts, and they were 
taking the nuclear family for granted. Kåks found 
that such scripts dominated, even among those who 
had experienced other kinds of family constellations 
(Kåks 2007: 285).
Following Kåks’ findings, it is likely that conven-
tional, heteronormative life scripts also structure 
how parents and grandparents imagine the future of 
their children and grandchildren. This seems to be 
the case with Hansen’s prediction of Jake’s future. 
When he writes that Jake “better first grow up to 
be strong and smart,” he draws on a conventional, 
gendered script of a successful life, making his fu-
ture seemingly predictable. This life-scripted future 
is however threatened by a narrative dissonance, 
introduced in the sentence: “Jake has no idea what 
he is in for.” “[W]hat he is in for” is what Hansen 
calls “[the] storms of my grandchildren.” The term 
“storms” is literarily referring to an expected in-
crease of extreme weather events in the future. But 
these “storms” are also used by Hansen as a meto-
nym for the climate-changed future as such. He de-
scribes this metonymic meaning in rather concrete 
terms: “Storms. That is the one word that will best 
characterize the twenty-first-century climate […]. 
Our grandchildren are in for a rough ride” (Hansen 
[2009]2011: 250). And continues:
In the first decade of this century, while the large 
ice sheets are just beginning to be softened up, we 
have seen significant increased warming in the 
high latitudes of the northern hemisphere, espe-
cially in central Asia and the Arctic. But once ice 
sheet disintegration begins in earnest, our grand-
children will live the rest of their lives in a chaotic 
transition period. (Hansen [2009]2011: 250)
When Hansen writes that Jake “better first grow up,” 
he seems to refer to this expected “chaotic transition 
period” in just a couple of decades. The subtitle of 
the book even terms it “the Coming Climate Catas-
trophe.” This climate catastrophe will collide with 
the hopes and dreams he has for Jake. Narratologi-
cally speaking, climate change will turn the life-
scripted predictability of his grandson’s future into 
unpredictable chaos.
In other terms, life-scripted family time makes 
the future seemingly tellable and imaginable, and to 
some extent fairly predictable. But this predictabil-
ity is threatened by climate chaos. Since this kind 
of imaginary future is based on family norms, it is 
not surprising that it is heteronormative. In the next 
section, I will examine how such a family-timed and 
narratively scripted notion of the future configures 
the relationship between the present-day and a cli-
mate-changed future. To do this, I will turn to Ba-
rack Obama’s speech at the opening session of the 
COP21-conference in Paris, on November 30, 2015.
“Our Children” as an Actant
According to Obama, the objective for the Paris-
conference was to build “the future we want for our 
children.”5 He uses two examples from his own ex-
perience to underscore this point. “Our children” 
is used rhetorically in both of them. In the follow-
ing close reading, I will concentrate on the first and 
most elaborate one:
This summer, I saw the effects of climate change 
firsthand in our northernmost state, Alaska, where 
the sea is already swallowing villages and eroding 
shorelines; where permafrost thaws and the tundra 
burns; where glaciers are melting at a pace unprece-
dented in modern times. And it was a preview of 
one possible future – a glimpse of our children’s fate 
if the climate keeps changing faster than our efforts 
to address it. Submerged countries. Abandoned cit-
ies. Fields that no longer grow. Political disruptions 
that trigger new conflict, and even more floods of 
desperate peoples seeking the sanctuary of nations 
not their own.6
In this passage, he is positioning himself as an 
eyewitness to “the effects of climate change,” but un-
like most testimonies, this one does not contain any 
details about what he has experienced. He starts by 
stating that he has visited Alaska, before he switches, 
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almost unnoticeably, to talk about Alaska in general 
terms. He does not name any people he has met, or 
places he has visited. Even the nature is described 
generally, as the extraordinary natural phenom-
ena of dramatic pace and scale; eroding shorelines, 
thawing permafrost, burning tundra and melting 
glaciers. By listing them, Obama demonstrates the 
power of an uncontrollable, imbalanced nature. The 
villages he is referring to appear as small enclaves of 
culture surrounded by this uncontrollable nature – 
that even swallows them. The devastation is total. 
Even though the description is dramatic, the vil-
lages remain unnamed. They are not referred to as 
specific cases, but as general examples of what might 
happen to any small village located along a shore-
line. It is a depiction of an apocalypse in miniature, 
pointing toward the future.
Furthermore, the list of natural phenomena is 
not just a list of consequences of climate change. 
Obama describes them as “a preview of one possible 
future.” As such a preview, they work as signs sig-
nifying a catastrophic future, or what Obama terms 
“a glimpse of our children’s fate.” This fate is also 
literarily presented as glimpses through incomplete 
sentences, some of them just containing adjectives 
and nouns: “Submerged countries. Abandoned cit-
ies. Fields that no longer grow.” These glimpses de-
scribe a general disastrous state of a climate-changed 
future. They are not geographically located and con-
tain no human subjects. Humans are included in 
the last glimpse, but through a natural metaphor, as 
“floods of desperate peoples.” This metaphor under-
scores how “our children’s fate” is destined by the 
uncontrollable force of not only nature, but also of 
humanity as nature, that is unleashed by the force 
of nature.
These glimpses of a disastrous future might be 
regarded as what literary scholar Isak Winkel Holm 
has termed a prophetic experiential mode. This 
mode is characterized by a mental projection into 
the moment after a future disaster, brought back to 
the present and told as an intensely affective expe-
rience to invoke engagement and avoid the coming 
disaster. The prophetic mode is a temporal and nar-
rative structure used in both canonized literature, 
such as Henrik Ibsen’s Brand and in popular culture, 
such as the TV-series True Detective (Holm 2016, 
2018; cf. Dupuy 2013). This temporally looped nar-
rative structure is connecting the disastrous future 
to the present. Holm shows how this mode draws on 
the temporal structure of the prophetic books of the 
Old Testament. It might be regarded as a disaster im-
aginary that not only frames the understanding of a 
future disaster. Drawing on disaster studies, Holm 
claims that it “frames our perception of the entire 
world” (Holm 2016: 105). He argues that this struc-
ture is relevant to understanding the contemporary 
political discourse where a potential disastrous fu-
ture is present (Holm 2018: 193–195). Used in a cli-
mate change discourse, where the future is described 
in all-encompassing catastrophic terms, and given 
the biblical undertones, this prophetic structure 
brings apocalyptic associations.
A number of scholars have pointed out the apoca-
lyptic character of popular climate change discourse 
(e.g. Anshelm & Hultman 2015; Cochet 2015; Hörn-
feldt 2018; Hulme 2008: 10–13; Johns-Putra 2016; 
Lilly 2016; Northcott 2015). The term apocalypse is, 
however, often used as simply a metaphor for a se-
vere societal collapse (cf. Skrimshire 2014: 237–239). 
The apocalyptic notion of a climate-changed future 
is undoubtedly metaphorical, as it is a secular imagi-
nary. However, it is more than just a metaphor, it is 
a narrative plot organizing the relationship between 
the end and present-day actions. Both a religious 
apocalypse and a metaphysical, secular one imply a 
complex temporal structure. Literary scholar Frank 
Kermode has remarked that there is a double tempo-
ral relationship between the present and the ending 
in apocalyptic narratives. With reference to theo-
logical literature, he uses the Greek terms chronos, 
meaning passing time until the end, and kairos, 
defined as “a point of time filled with significance, 
charged with a meaning derived from its relation to 
the end” (1967: 47; cf. Johns-Putra 2016: 525). The 
kairos structure underscores how the apocalypse is 
as much about the significance of the present as it is 
about the future.
Moreover, regarded as a metaphoric, secular plot, 
the apocalyptically configurated climate-changed 
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future is not the end of the earthy world. It is rather 
a global disastrous state or, in worst case, the end of 
contemporary civilization. In Obama’s case, “our 
children’s fate” is depicted as a totally devastated and 
chaotic world. This metaphoric, apocalyptic plot is 
double-ended, it also includes an alternative to the 
all-encompassing cataclysmic transformation of the 
world. The alternative is most often formulated as 
either sustainability or as a progress narrative about 
technological development that will solve the cli-
mate crisis and facilitate further economic growth 
(Kverndokk 2017: 39–41).
Following Kermode’s distinction between chronos 
and kairos and the double-ended structure of the 
apocalyptic climate narrative, there are three iden-
tifiable layers of futurity implied in the plotting of 
Obama’s speech. All three of them are about the 
future of “our children”. The first one is what will 
happen: The children will grow up. The second is 
what we fear will happen, or what Obama terms 
“one possible future.” In other words, an uncon-
trollable climatic catastrophe. The third is what 
hopefully will happen, “the future we want for our 
children.” This is apparently a happy ending, and as 
such, not really an ending. Like all happy endings, 
it is a reestablishment of narrative balance, enabling 
life to continue as planned. The second and third 
are structured as kairos, or how the “now” is signifi-
cantly related to the possible endings. The plot of the 
climate-changed future is, in other words, unfolding 
in the tension between these two futurities, while 
the first one represents passing time indicating the 
chronology of the narrative. The narrative function 
of “our children” is in this case to mediate between 
the present and the future both by representing the 
end of the story, and by indicating the passing of 
life-scripted family time by simply growing up. In 
both regards, “our children” might be regarded as 
the actant, in folklorist Vladimir Propp’s and liter-
ary scholar Algirdas Greimas’ sense of the term.
Propp’s classic study of the morphology of the 
folktale emphasizes the narrative function of the 
actors, and how they work as vehicles for bringing 
the action forward, to the end. He argued that just 
a few such function-defined classes of actors were 
necessary for a folktale to develop, enabling “the 
hero” to fulfill his or her task. Propp suggested sev-
en such “spheres of actions” (Propp 1968: 79–80). 
Greimas later reduced them to six and termed them 
actants (Greimas [1966]1983).7 He argued that they 
not only operate in folktales, but rather characterize 
narrative structures in general.8
My analysis is only concerned with the two key 
actants in Greimas’ model: the subject – the one 
reaching for a goal9 – and the object – which is de-
fined as what the subject is aiming for (Bal 1997: 197; 
cf. Greimas [1966]1983). In the quote from Obama, 
“our children” seems at first glance to be the main 
characters, since it is about their future. However, 
regarded from a Greimasian point of view, it is not 
the case. “Our children” are not ascribed any agency 
– they just happen to grow up. They are not reaching 
for a goal – they simply have a “fate”. The goal, ac-
cording to Obama’s speech, is to save them from this 
fate. In this regard, they work as the object-actant.
The possessive pronoun “our” has a significant 
narrative function in the speech, by constituting a 
relationship between the object “our children” and 
a “we”. It is “we” that are given agency, working as 
the active subject-actant. This subject-actant/object-
actant relationship between “we” and “our children” 
is a symbolic parent–child one. While Hansen is 
specifically referring to his grandchildren, Obama is 
speaking in a general plural form, referring to “our 
children”, as the children of the earth. Equally, “we” 
refers generally to a generation of global adults. Or, 
more specifically, “we” seems to refer to the political 
leaders representing the world’s population. In other 
terms, Obama and the other politicians and policy 
makers attending the COP21 conference in Paris 
fill the subject-actant of “the parent”. By structur-
ing his speech around the temporal logic of kairos, 
he highlights the delegates at the conference as the 
possible heroes or villains of the story of climate 
change, inhabiting at the same time a cumulative 
guilt and the potential for a solution. In this way 
he emphasizes the COP21 conference as the mo-
ment that determines the ending of the dual plot of 
a climate-changed future. It is a moment of almost 
cosmological dimensions, or in Kermode’s terms, “a 
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point of time filled with significance, changing with 
a meaning derived from its relation to the end” (Ker-
mode 1967: 47).
In this way, Obama elegantly demonstrates the 
rhetorical force of the symbolic “parent–child” re-
lationship and underscores the importance of the 
Paris conference. By using the symbolic “parent–
child” relationship for authorizing his message, he 
also demonstrates how “the parent” has been used as 
a privileged position of enunciation in climate poli-
tics (cf. Foucault [1969]2002: 55–61). The authority 
of this position is based on what Sheldon has termed 
a heteronormative reproductive futurism.
The Grandparent as a Position of Enunciation
In Storms of my Grandchildren, Hansen describes 
how the experience of becoming and being a grand-
parent motivated him to engage in climate politics 
and activism:
I myself changed over the last eight years, espe-
cially after my wife, Anniek, and I had our first 
grandchildren. […] I did not want my grandchil-
dren, someday in the future, to look back and say, 
“Opa understood what was happening, but he did 
not make it clear.” […] If it hadn’t been for my 
grandchildren and my knowledge of what they 
would face, I would have stayed focused on the 
pure science, and not persisted in pointing out its 
relevance to policy. (Hansen [2009]2011: XII)
By emphasizing that his motivation for his engage-
ment was his grandchildren, and his “knowledge of 
what they would face,” he also transforms the fam-
ily status of being a grandparent into a position of 
enunciation. This is underscored by the words he 
puts in his grandchildren’s mouths at some point in 
the future: “Opa understood what was happening, 
but he did not make it clear.” He not only engages 
because of his grandchildren. He engages as a grand-
father, with his grandchildren as addressees.
It is tempting to relate Obama’s and Hansen’s rhe-
torical use of “our children”/“my grandchildren” to 
American family values, but the practice of struc-
turing the future as life-scripted family cycles is not 
just American. I will now turn to the Norwegian 
environmental organization the Grandparents’ Cli-
mate Campaign to examine how the subject-actant/
object-actant relationship between “the (grand)
parent” and “our (grand)children” authorizes the 
parent/grandparent as a privileged position of 
enunciation in climate change discourse. Follow-
ing the actant-model both parents and grandparents 
work as subjects, yet, they fill the actant-position 
in slightly different ways. The grandparents hold a 
double educational and caretaker position. To get 
grandchildren gives them a second chance to raise 
children. This time ideally without economic re-
sponsibility, but with accumulated life-experiences 
and the experience of having raised their own chil-
dren. At the same time, they are still parents, and as 
such they may advise their children in how to raise 
the grandchildren. Hence, grandparents may at the 
same time work as co-educators/caretakers and as 
supra-educators/caretakers.
The Grandparents’ Climate Campaign was found-
ed in 2006.10 It was originally established as a loose 
cross-political network, but reorganized as a formal 
environmental organization in 2012. In March 2018 
it had about 1,900 members.11 Despite a modest 
number of members, it has been a significant con-
tributor to Norwegian public debate for more than a 
decade, partly due to its many prominent members.
Its founders were a group of elderly people, sev-
eral of whom had possessed influential positions in 
Norwegian political and public life. In late 2006, a 
founding statement was published in several Nor-
wegian newspapers, proclaiming the need for what 
was termed a “responsible climate politics” (Willoch 
et al. 2006). Among the people that signed it were a 
former central bank governor, two former bishops, 
two retired professors, two acclaimed authors and 
five previously high-profile politicians.
Three of those signing the founding statement 
were interviewed by the newspaper Aftenposten on 
December 4, 2006 (Hegtun 2006). These three were 
the former prime minister and former leader of the 
Conservative Party12, Kåre Willoch (aged 78), the 
former leader of the Labor Party13, Reiulf Steen (aged 
73), and the founder of the influential environmental 
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organization The Future in Our Hands14, Erik Dam-
mann (aged 75). The interview elaborated on the 
recently published statement of the Grandparents’ 
Climate Campaign, using a quote from the state-
ment as a starting point: “As grandparents we have 
remained too silent for too long.”15 Hence, Aftenpos-
ten not merely presented these elderly men as former 
public figures. The objective of the article was rather 
to position them as grandparents involved in the en-
vironmental debate.
The article demonstrates how a family experience 
of being a grandparent is transformed into a privi-
leged position of enunciation in environmental and 
political debate. The headline reads: “Look, grand-
father is warning.”16 It is wordplay based on the line: 
“Look, grandfather is dancing,”17 from the Norwe-
gian song “The Grandfather’s Waltz,”18 made popu-
lar by the artist Einar Rose in 1932. The reference 
to this song indicates that these grandfathers are 
actively engaging in politics again – they are, so to 
speak, back on the political dancefloor, as grandpar-
ents concerned for the future. To demonstrate that 
they were not only symbolically speaking from the 
grandparent position, Dammann and Steen brought 
their grandchildren, Mathias (aged 11) and Mia 
(aged 16), with them. The grandchildren do not play 
a significant part in this article, other than exem-
plifying a future needing to be saved. Mathias and 
Mia’s presence not only worked as an exemplifica-
tion of future generations. It also displayed the three 
men’s personal concern for their own grandchildren. 
In a concrete way, they turned family concerns into 
a subject for environmental politics. In that sense, 
Mathias and Mia worked efficiently as mediators be-
tween a family sphere and a political one. It is also 
worth noticing how they mediated across former 
political disagreements. Two former politicians and 
one activist, with radically different political back-
grounds, were seemingly able to reconcile through 
their joint position as grandparents. The responsi-
bility as grandfathers seems to raise fundamental 
moral concerns for the future. They reprehend to-
day’s politicians by not only drawing on their profes-
sional experience, but also explicitly by drawing on 
their experiences as grandfathers. Thus, when they 
engage in politics again, they do it as supra-caretak-
ers, as grandparents both in and of politics.
When these three men claim public authority 
by referring to their family positions, they draw on 
well-established political symbolism. The family 
and the home have been widely used as analogies 
for the nation and the society in Western history, 
for instance expressed through metaphors such as 
“the fatherland”, “homeland” or the much-used 
Swedish term “folkhemmet” (the people’s home). 
Such metaphors and analogies have a long history. 
In Protestant countries they are historically related 
to a patriarchic notion of society. Luther understood 
the king as paterfamilias of the state, the clergyman 
as paterfamilias of his parish and the father as pa-
terfamilias of the home, responsible for both basic 
religious and societal upbringing (Markussen 2018: 
41–44). The Protestant doctrine of these three dis-
ciplining estates (the state, the church and the fam-
ily) in the early modern Lutheran state has its con-
tinuation in the educational ideology of the modern 
nation-state, as a relationship between two “homes”, 
the family home and the fatherland (cf. Thorkildsen 
1995: 55–61, 87–88). Thus, there is a historical pa-
triarchic bias in the rhetorical uses of the grandpar-
ent–child relationship, which is striking in the way 
the three elderly public figures, Willoch, Steen and 
Dammann, position themselves as grandfathers in 
climate politics.
Linguists Mateusz-Milan Stanojević and Ljiljana 
Šarić have pointed out that family analogies and 
metaphors for the nation and the society “make it 
possible to conceptualize human communities as 
extended families” (Stanojević & Šarić 2019: 14). 
This is what happens in the uses of “our children 
and grandchildren” in popular climate change dis-
course. In this article, I have argued that the child-
trope is not merely a metonym for the “concept of 
responsibility for future generations”; it is also used 
to describe the relationship between the climate-
changed future and the present in family-timed 
terms. In that regard, the trope relates societal de-
velopment to the family in quite direct terms. The 
interview with Willoch, Steen and Dammann, and 
Hansen’s Storms of my Grandchildren demonstrate 
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that the trope is more than just a metonym. The 
way these four elderly men talk about the future 
in family-timed terms implies a constant blurring 
of the distinction between the actual grandfathers, 
caring for their own grandchildren, and the posi-
tion of the symbolic grandparent talking generally 
about the future in terms of children and grand-
children. This is at the same time a blurring of the 
distinction between family status and the political 
sphere, that turns the relationship between what the 
philosopher Jürgen Habermas has termed the life-
world and the system on its head. Habermas argues 
that the system tends to colonialize the lifeworld in a 
modern society (Habermas [1981]1988). However, by 
transforming family status into a privileged position 
of enunciation in politics, the lifeworld, with all its 
social norms and taken-for-granted-ness, seemingly 
invades the system, at least on the level of discourse.
Conclusion
The parent–child relationship is a way to organize 
time, founded on family-timed life cycles. While 
both climate modeling and climate agreements use 
more or less arbitrary dates for anticipating and 
calculating the future, such as 2030, 2050 and 2100, 
family time does not date the future. The future ap-
pears instead as the expectations of continuing life-
spans and upcoming life experiences. In that way, 
family time makes the future seemingly tellable and 
imaginable.
In this article, I have argued that a family-timed 
future implies a specific kind of plotting of the re-
lationship between the present and the future. The 
life-scripted future of children and grandchildren 
constitutes one part of a plot of a climate-changed 
future, as an alternative to a climate catastrophe. 
This plot ascribes both “our children” and “the par-
ent” specific narrative functions as subject-actant 
and object-actant. The dual narrative structure, and 
the subject-actant/object-actant relationship embed-
ded in it, is used to authorize a privileged position of 
enunciation of “the parent” in climate politics and 
activism. “Our children” is not just a metonym for 
the “concept of responsibility for future genera-
tions,” referring to what environmental philosophy 
and economy terms intergenerational equality. The 
terms “my/our children” and “my/our grandchil-
dren” refer to something more specific than the 
general and temporally endless term “future genera-
tions”. The position of enunciation of “the parent” 
or “grandparent” is more than a symbolic position, 
it also draws heavily on the specific experiences and 
family obligations of being a parent or a grandpar-
ent. In that way, it blurs the distinction between a 
private family sphere and a public, political one.
Consequently, the family-timed figuration of 
“our children” in climate change discourse tends to 
work as a vehicle for downscaling climate change, in 
both temporal and spatial senses. The most striking 
example of such downscaling mentioned in this ar-
ticle is Hansen’s argument about the contemporary 
relevance of PETM, where he appeals to the readers 
to pay attention to the scientific knowledge about 
the event “for the sake of your children and grand-
children” (Hansen [2009]2011: 161). The intention 
is presumably pedagogic, yet the result is that the 
distinction between very different timescales and 
spatial scales is collapsing. A change in the global 
climate almost 56 million years ago, that lasted for 
200,000 years, is made relevant for the readers as 
here-and-now family concerns.
The downscaling through “our children” delimits 
the time span of the climate-changed future to one 
or two generations ahead. This kind of downscal-
ing implies a dramatization of the future. It moves 
a possible climatic all-encompassing catastrophe 
closer, making room for such statements, as Emma-
nuel Macron’s wish to offer our children “a planet 
still habitable in twenty-five years.” Such downscal-
ing does not only work as a way of authorizing a cer-
tain position of enunciation of “the parent”. It also 
enables young people such as Greta Thunberg to step 
forward, positioning themselves as children speak-
ing “on behalf of future generations” (Thunberg 
2019: 57), demanding political action. Thunberg and 
the Fridays for Future movement draw heavily on the 
established “child” trope and the future-dimension 
embedded in it, and have rhetorically succeeded in 
turning the object into a subject. By appealing to the 
embedded, yet unfulfilled, caretaking aspect of the 
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“parent” position, they have succeeded in turning 
“our children” into a privileged position of enuncia-
tion in climate change discourse (Kverndokk 2019). 
In this article, I have shown how a rhetorical founda-
tion for doing this was established long before Thun-
berg entered the stage.
Notes
 1 The article is part of the project The Future is Now: 
Temporality and Exemplarity in Climate Change Dis-
courses, funded by the Research Council of Norway. I 
will especially thank Marit Ruge Bjærke, Anne Eriksen, 
Anne Leonora Blaakilde and Audun Kjus for advices 
and comments to the manuscript.
 2 Quoted from YouTube: CNN: Macron warns US Con-
gress: There’s no Planet B, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=XYTx4DrBhzM (accessed March 3, 2019).
 3 Besteforeldrenes klimaaksjon.
 4 There is a parallel of this way of thinking in memory 
theory. Alaida and Jan Assmann argues that com-
municative memory, that is orally and/or informally 
communicated, are transmitted across generations. 
It is a kind of memory in between personal memory 
and scholarly, archival-based history. Jan Assmann 
links communicative memory to generational time, 
and claims that this kind of memory has a temporal 
horizon that “does not extend more than eighty to 
(at the very most) one hundred years into the past, 
which equals three or four generation” (Assmann 
1995: 127).
 5 The White House: President Barack Obama: Remarks 
by President Obama at the First Session of COP21, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2015/11/30/remarks-president-obama-first-ses-
sion-cop21 (accessed March 26, 2018).
 6 The White House: President Barack Obama: Remarks 
by President Obama at the First Session of COP21, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2015/11/30/remarks-president-obama-first-ses-
sion-cop21 (accessed March 26, 2018).
 7 The actants in Greimas’ model are: 1) “The subject” 
reaching for 2) “the object” (the goal of the story). 3) 
“The sender” is the one initiating the action by sending 
the hero or “the subject” off to reach for “the object”, 
while 4) “the receiver” benefits from the action. 5) “The 
helper” simply helps “the subject” to reach “the object”, 
while 6) “the opponent” tries to prevent it from hap-
pening (Greimas [1966]1983).
 8 The Propp-Greimasian model does not distinguish 
between human or non-human actants; the actant 
could just as well be an animal or object as a person. 
Philosopher Bruno Latour has applied Greimas’ term 
actant to actor-network theory. In this article, I will 
however use the term strictly in a Propp-Greimasian 
sense.
 9 It equals both “the hero” and “the villain” in Propp’s 
scheme, depending on which of them is successfully 
reaching his or her goal.
 10 The Grandparents’ Climate Campaign has its equal 
in several countries: Canada (For Our Grandchildren 
and The Suzuki Elders), Great Britain (Grandparents’ 
Climate Action), Switzerland (Grands-parents pour 
le climat/Klima-Grosseltern Schweiz) and France 
(Grands-parents pour le climat). In June 2014, these 
organizations signed the “Statement of Concerned 
Grandparents International” calling for “a new mor-
al leadership, giving priority to the safety of all our 
grandchildren and their right to a sustainable planet.” 
This statement is also signed by the former bishop and 
Nobel Peace Prize holder Desmond Tutu, the Canadian 
activist and former leader of the Inuit Circumpolar 
Council Sheila Watt-Cloutier, and James Hansen.
 11 See Besteforeldrenes klimaaksjon: About the Grand-
parents Campaign, http://www.besteforeldreaksjonen.
no/?page_id=1467; Besteforeldrenes klimaaksjon: Bak-
grunn og historie, http://www.besteforeldreaksjonen. 
no/?page_id=28; Besteforeldrenes klimaaksjon: Formål 
og vedtekter, http://www.besteforeldreaksjonen.no/?page_
id=6 (all three webpages accessed April 26, 2018).
 12 Høyre.
 13 Arbeiderpartiet.
 14 Framtiden i våre hender.
 15 “Som besteforeldre har vi vært altfor tause altfor lenge.”
 16  “Se, der advarer bestefar.”
 17 “Se, der danser bestefar.”
 18 “Bestefarsvalsen,” by Arne Svendsen.
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